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This paper describes concepts and tools behind macroprudential monitoring, and the 
growing importance of macroprudential tools for assessing the stability of financial 
systems. This paper also employs a macroprudential approach in examining financial 
soundness and identifying its determinants. Using data from selected developing 
economies in Asia, South America, and Europe, as well as selected economies from the 
developed world, panel regressions are estimated to quantify the impacts of the major 
influences on key financial soundness indicators, including capital adequacy, asset 
quality, and earnings and profitability. 
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During the past few decades, the world has experienced various episodes of financial 
distress at the country, regional, and global levels. Consequently, the health and stability 
of financial systems has become a major topic of concern on the international policy 
agenda. While the onset of a crisis in any financial system can seem surprising, there 
may be signals of financial vulnerabilities in the system that could aid in the formulation 
and implementation of responses for preventing financial distress or mitigating the 
impact of their effects.  
 
In the wake of the current global financial crisis, there has been widespread recognition 
for the need to (i) strengthen links among key components of a financial system, (ii) 
examine carefully how systemic risk varies over time, and (iii) study the robustness of 
that system when hit by shocks or systemic risk. Excessive risk-taking combined with a 
lack of prudential supervision and loose monetary policy is generally viewed as 
important contributors to the current financial crisis. While banks survive and prosper by 
accepting risks, the risks they take must be well managed. Central banks and regulators 
have a fundamental role in ensuring financial stability by monitoring the performance of 
banks and other institutions, but their collective actions were clearly not enough to 
prevent the crisis. The current global financial crisis, which has also become an 
economic crisis, has accentuated the importance of systematically introducing a 
macroprudential approach for assessing soundness in financial systems as well as in 
individual financial institutions. Regulators need to identify banks that do not manage 
their risks well. However, such monitoring should not only be concerned with the stability 
of individual institutions, but should also include a macroprudential orientation that 
comprises monitoring, regulation, and supervision to examine how risk is distributed 
across a financial system at any given point in time and identify and address how 
aggregate risk evolves over time. Although the need for a macroprudential approach has 
heightened over the past 15 years, the macroprudential toolbox is still in the process of 
development and its concepts are as complex as they are poorly understood. In addition, 
a macroprudential approach needs to be flexible to take into consideration the changing 
dynamics of the global financial system.  
 
A macroprudential approach can be viewed as being two-dimensional—cross-sectional 
and time-dimensional—with implications for monitoring financial system soundness, the 
calibration of prudential tools,
1  and ultimately, the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions. It provides a framework to monitor, examine and address risks to financial 
stability. One purpose for monitoring would be to aid in the early detection and timely 
recognition of financial vulnerabilities across financial instruments, financial markets, and 
financial institutions, thus alerting supervisory and regulatory authorities and the financial 
industry. Another would be to try to assess the likely consequences on financial stability 
and the risk of failure of individual institutions, which would be helpful for assisting 
financial market supervisors and regulators to formulate and implement remedial actions 
that allow businesses to adjust their strategies and limit significant real economic losses. 
Such a system-wide approach provides an analytical tool for linking macroeconomic 
development, risk-taking, and financial system stability. 
                                                 
1  Existing prudential tools such as risk weighted capital requirements, as exemplified by Basel II, are 
already supposed to ensure that higher risks demand higher capital. The problem, however, was that 
regulators' measurement could be error prone.  
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Across economies, examinations have been undertaken of macroeconomic and financial 
soundness indicators (FSIs) that are useful for a macroprudential approach, especially 
for the purpose of regularly identifying coincidental and leading signals of financial 
vulnerability. Cross-country studies have also been carried out, but with difficulties owing 
to data issues (e.g., inherent differences in data sets, definitions of indicators, frequency 
and accuracy of data) and to the widely diverse stages of development of the financial 
systems being studied. FSIs are also mainly backward-looking indicators (as opposed to 
forward-looking). In addition, higher frequency data are generally more desirable to have 
for monitoring and evaluation of a financial system since higher frequency data can 
better foreshadow emerging vulnerabilities than the annual aggregate FSI data used 
here in this paper.
2 Capturing systemic risk through indicators and through supervision 
and regulation thus requires an assessment of financial stability using a range of 
approaches and indicators. It also requires the integration of the various perspectives of 
market participants—supervisors, regulators, rating agencies, risk managers, 
economists and many other stakeholders—to take a holistic view of the financial system. 
 
Macroprudential monitoring—the focus of this paper—examines trends in the economy 
and the financial system as a whole that can impact financial stability and trigger large-
scale financial crises. With larger institutions, greater competition across market 
segments, and the growing importance of capital markets, interrelationships among 
individual institutions and their products and markets need to be examined in the context 
of the risks that the largest institutions pose to the overall financial system. With 
microprudential stability being neither necessary nor sufficient for macro stability, 
macroprudential supervision and regulation is concerned with encouraging financial 
institutions to behave in a different way in instances when taking a risk that may be 
considered prudent behavior for a single institution could be destabilizing if the same risk 
were taken by a number of institutions.  
 
Based on a survey of existing macroprudential literature and work programs at 
government and international institutions and organizations, the outline of the paper is as 
follows. Section two provides a conceptual approach of macroprudential monitoring, 
dimensions, objectives and components. Section three discusses measurement issues 
including identification and compilation of relevant data and information as well as 
limitations of a macroprudential approach. Section four describes analytical methods for 
understanding trends and patterns in macroprudential data, as well as practices in 
macroprudential monitoring. Section five discusses the data employed in this study 
compiled from selected developing economies in Asia, South America, and Europe, as 
well as selected economies from the developed world. Also discussed are a 
methodology for making sense of these macroprudential data, and the estimation 
results. Section six concludes with a discussion on challenges ahead and policy 
options—including developing a macroprudential approach to supervision that can 
complement and reinforce monetary policy while sustaining economic growth, 
coordinating between financial safety net players and fiscal authorities, communication 
strategies for policymakers, and the importance of both regional and international 
cooperation and coordination. 
 
 
                                                 
2  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is developing through its Data Link Project a set of timely and 
higher-frequency indicators for, at least initially, systemically important countries.  




2.  The Conceptual Approach of Macroprudential Monitoring: 
Dimensions, Objectives, and Components 
 
Throughout history, financial crises have recurred, with episodes of acute financial 
instabilities increasingly prevalent at the close of the twentieth century.
3 Experience also 
suggests that there have been enormous financial costs to these crises, including direct 
assistance to affected firms, and indirect costs that result when institutions abuse 
government protections and take unproductive risks. In addition, there have also been 
sizable losses
4 in the real sector arising from financial crises in both industrial and 
emerging market economies. Given the recognized importance of economic growth to 
poverty reduction, economic losses ultimately result in setbacks to poverty reduction and 
other development targets. Consequently, in recent years, the international community 
has highlighted the need to strengthen safeguards against financial instability. One such 
safeguard is strengthening and calibrating the macroprudential orientation of monitoring 
financial soundness and regulating and supervising financial institutions. 
 
2.1  Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions 
 
Before delving into macroprudential monitoring, it is helpful to distinguish the 
macroprudential dimension from the microprudential.
5 The two differ in objective, focus, 
approach, view of risk, and in their calibration of tools (Table 1). The macroprudential 
dimension focuses on the financial system as a whole to limit the chances of system-
wide distress and avoid significant losses in terms of real output. The microprudential 
dimension focuses on individual institutions to limit the likelihood of failure of individual 
institutions and protect consumers (investors and depositors) regardless of systemic 
consequences or impact on the overall economy. Microprudential supervision can thus 
fail to identify risks that emerge at the systemic level. The two approaches view risk 
differently: the macroprudential dimension considers risk to be endogenous since 
institutions can collectively affect economic transactions, while the microprudential 
dimension assumes risk to be exogenous since individual institutions will generally have 
little impact on the economy. Thus, the microprudential dimension examines individual 
institutions, products, and markets, while the macroprudential view looks at the 
interactions within the system as a whole and allows for endogeneity or feedback. The 
macroprudential dimension is also top-down in its calibration of prudential instruments, 
                                                 
3  Kindleberger (1978) provides an account of financial instabilities and crises across history. According to 
Bordo et al. (2001), the frequency of financial instabilities has doubled since the end of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary order in 1973, afflicting either exchange rate and balance of payments 
problems or the banking system, or both simultaneously, through "twin crises" (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999). 
4  Eichengreen (2004) point out that “the loss from the average or typical financial crisis is around 9% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) and the severe crisis, such as those of Argentina and Indonesia, caused 
output or GDP to fall over 20%, an economic loss higher than those [countries] incurred due to the 
Great Depression.” Hoggarth et al. (2001) estimate that cumulative output losses from a financial crisis 
can be as much as 30% of annual GDP. Much of this cost is evident through declines in household 
consumption (Barrell et al., 2006) and disproportionately affects the poor (Weller and Hersh, 2004). 
According to Chen and Ravallion (2001), the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis increased the number of 
people in the region living on less than USD1 per day by 22 million. Lustig (2000) as well as Lindgren, 
Garcia, and Saal (1996) note that developing economies have been particularly prone to financial 
instability. 
5  Borio (2003).  
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while the microprudential approach is bottom-up. Some differences may also reflect 
historical and institutional aspects, including whether prudential powers are located with 
central banks or divided among separate agencies. 
 
There are also differences between macro- and micro-prudential approaches in how 
prudential tools should be calibrated. Cross-sectionally, the tools of macroprudential 
frameworks can be tailored to an individual institution’s contribution to systemic risk. 
Tighter standards, for example, might be applied to institutions with larger contributions 
to systemic risk. This means that macroprudential tools—capital requirements, 
provisioning, and leverage ratios—may need to be calibrated for addressing common 
exposures and joint failures, as well as for addressing pro-cyclicality. Macroprudential 
regulation and supervision encourages an institution to behave in a different way if there 
were a risk that behavior normally considered prudent would undermine the financial 
system if followed by a number of institutions. For example, when an institution 
liquidates assets to reduce risk exposure in response to a negative shock to its portfolio, 
these asset sales drive down prices and lead to losses for other institutions, which in 
turn may seek to protect themselves by also liquidating assets. This is likely to trigger a 
spiral of asset price declines and portfolio liquidation as risks considered exogenous to 
any one institution become endogenous to the financial system.
6 Macroprudential tools 
can also be designed to build buffers in good economic times that can be used during 
bad times. Even the risk weighted capital requirement in Basel II is supposed to be 
supplemented (in Pillar 2) by variable minimum ratios dependent on the supervisors' 
judgments. In many cases, but perhaps few in developing economies, supervisors have 
required higher minimum ratios for some banks than others. This has in general, led to 
lower ratios for large banks—assumed to benefit from greater diversification—and higher 
ratios for small banks. Now the paradigm has shifted, with suggestions that the opposite 
may be more appropriate. 
Table 1: Comparison between Macroprudential and Microprudential Monitoring
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6  Crockett (2009). 
7  Borio (2003).  




Although it may seem as though the macro- and micro-prudential dimensions are 
compartmentalized, these two paradigms generally co-exist to varying degrees among 
regulatory and supervisory authorities. From a policy perspective, trade-offs clearly arise 
when focusing on either one dimension or the other. Therefore, it is important to find 
balance and synergy between the two dimensions in order to ensure lasting financial 
stability.  
 
2.2 Objectives   
 
The objective of macroprudential monitoring is to examine trends in the economy and 
the financial system as a whole that can impact financial stability and trigger large-scale 
financial crises. If individual institutions are well managed, and markets function 
efficiently and the infrastructure supporting the financial system is strong, then the 
incidence of financial stress is likely to be less frequent and the associated costs much 
lower. But the recurrence of financial market turmoil implies that institutions are not 
necessarily well managed, markets do not always function efficiently, and the supporting 
financial infrastructure has weaknesses. 
 
Vulnerabilities in a financial system can build up over time and the system’s operation 
depends on macroeconomic developments that affect individual institutions. It is 
important to take stock of the inter-relationship between financial markets and the real 
economy to better understand risk and the unfolding of financial stress. While each crisis 
may differ in detail, nearly all reflect a confluence of some underlying economic 
vulnerability and a specific crisis trigger. Commonly, risk contagion comes from 
exposures to the same source of risk factors. Exposure also tends to build up on the 
asset side of the balance sheets as opposed to the liability side.
8 However, the crisis 
trigger can be almost any event, including political turmoil, terms of trade shocks, 
contagion from other economies, or the collapse of the United States (US) subprime 
market that set off the unfolding of the financial and economic crisis in 2007.
9 It is also 
probably true that the longer the trigger is delayed, the more severe the crisis and 
perhaps also the more dramatic the trigger has to be to precipitate the crisis. 
 
From a macroprudential view, focus should be placed on the major sectors and 
institutions of the financial system. Banking institutions are particularly relevant because 
of their specific function as suppliers of liquidity to the system and because the impact of 
financial stress at these institutions can have significant macroeconomic costs. Many 
economies have already ordered their priorities so that large financial institutions are 
subject to more rigorous monitoring than smaller institutions since the failure of the latter 
might be more easily absorbed without systemic implications. This, however, did not 
prevent such institutions from being the ones worst hit. A new view of systemically 
important institutions has emerged in the wake of the recent global financial crisis, which 
clearly demonstrated how tightly linked regulated and unregulated financial institutions 
are through markets and counterparty relationships, and how spillover effects from 
shocks can be transmitted through these linkages and interactions.  
 
                                                 
8  In the recent global financial crisis imbalances were in several cases more on the liabilities side. It was 
for example Northern Rock's reliance on the wholesale markets that brought it down. 
9  Ghosh et al. (2009).  
6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 43 
 
With the growing importance of financial markets for the provision of credit, the transfer 
of risk, and risk management, it is critical that financial markets continue to function 
smoothly under all circumstances. Increasing globalization, financial innovation, and the 
dispersal of risk have recently tested existing frameworks for monitoring the soundness 
of global financial markets. The onset of the recent global crisis suggests that although 
the economies most affected by the crisis probably had more developed analysis and 
were in the forefront of the development of so-called financial stability reporting, 
surveillance of financial markets has been rather weak. A systematic macroprudential 
approach can contribute to this process by providing a quantitative basis for qualitative 
assessments and policy discussions by financial supervisory authorities. 
 
2.3 Components   
 
The macroprudential approach includes monitoring and evaluating various indicators to 
provide a broad picture of the stability and efficiency of a financial system, and to identify 
potential future threats to systemic stability (Figure 1). These macroprudential 
components will be discussed in further detail below and include (i) FSIs, (ii) 
macroeconomic indicators, (iii) market based data, (iv) qualitative information, and (v) 
structural information. Quantitative analysis of macroprudential data can take the form of 
early warning systems (EWS), scenario analysis, or stress tests, all of which can help 
identify the factors that drive vulnerabilities in the financial system. While the benefits of 
quantitative work are promising, it is still in its infancy and can only be an element in a 
broader qualitative assessment of existing and potential financial vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 1: Components of a Macroprudential Framework 
 
Source: ADB Staff.  




Macroprudential monitoring has as its starting point the statutory goals common to most 
financial supervisory and regulatory authorities. These goals are essentially aimed at 
maintaining a stable and efficient financial system. While all financial institutions can be 
included in a macroprudential approach, in practice this approach has largely been 
applied to the banking system. This may be especially appropriate in emerging 
economies, which remain largely bank dominated despite substantial strides in capital 
market development. Banks also manage the intermediation of savings and supply 
liquidity to the financial system. If there is no functioning banking and payments system, 
then contributions to pensions, insurance, and savings schemes cannot be made, and 
temporary liquidity cannot be safely held. Another reason for the focus on the banking 
system is that of systemic risk, with contagion effects via the interbank market to the rest 
of the domestic financial sector, or to the entire global financial system as was the case 
in the recent crisis, causing major disruptions to global financial systems and the global 
real economy.  
 
(i)  FSIs are based on regulatory requirements such as directives, laws, and 
regulations. Key FSIs are generally in the form of ratios derivable from aggregated 
information contained in the balance sheets and profit and loss (income) statements of 
individual financial institutions. These indicators provide information on the current health 
of financial institutions and can prove helpful in identifying potential stability risks to the 
financial system that might be missed using only microprudential indicators and 
macroeconomic statistics. FSIs include data on so-called CAMELS indicators— 
measures of capital adequacy (e.g., risk-based capital ratio), asset quality (e.g., ratio of 
nonperforming loans relative to capital), management soundness (e.g., expense ratios), 
earnings and profitability (e.g., rate of returns on assets or equity), liquidity (e.g., central 
bank credit to financial institutions as a proportion of their capital or liabilities), and 
sensitivity to market risks (e.g., foreign exchange risks and interest rate risks). The IMF 
has identified a core set and an encouraged set of FSIs for macroprudential 
surveillance.
10 The core set of FSIs covers the banking sector to reflect its important role 
in financial systems as disruptions in the intermediation function of the banking system 
will negatively impact the investment financing that is needed in productive sectors of the 
economy. The encouraged set of FSIs includes additional indicators for the banking 
system as well as indicators for key nonfinancial sectors that can be a potential source 
of risk for banks and thereby serve as an aid in detecting banking sector vulnerabilities 
that lead to systemic stress. 
 
(ii)  Macroeconomic indicators are generally risk-oriented and leading indicators. 
These provide a broad picture of overall economic activity and financial circumstances. 
These indicators include measures of economic growth, balance of payments, inflation, 
and production. They suggest likely economic trends and, consequently, help evaluate 
whether prices and quantities in credit markets are consistent with such prospects. 
Inflation data, for instance, give evidence on the ease and tightness of monetary policy. 
Any discrepancy between data and policy may in itself offer a cause for concern of 
system vulnerabilities. Empirical studies have demonstrated that financial crises are 
likely to be preceded by some combination of sustained and above-normal rates of 
growth for credit, asset prices, and investment. In emerging economies, econometric 
models have also shown that overvalued exchange rates play a role in predicting crises 
and currency mismatches. Thus, it is important to monitor macroeconomic factors, 
                                                 
10 IMF (2006).  
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especially those that affect the vulnerability of an economy to capital flow reversals and 
currency crises.  
 
(iii)  Market-based data convey market perceptions about the health of financial 
institutions and the degree of risk and financial system vulnerability. Examples of 
market-based data include yields and spreads of financial instruments, asset prices, 
external based creditworthiness and sovereign ratings, interest rates, exchange rates, 
and, in some markets, stock market volatility and distance to default. These data are 
forward-looking indicators of financial soundness and are typically continuously 
available. Given that the financial systems and banking structures of many economies 
are underdeveloped, market data may currently not play a significant role. However, 
monitoring market data, which can be expected to gain in importance as markets evolve, 
is encouraged whenever feasible as it conveys market perceptions about the health of 
banks. 
 
(iv)  Qualitative information, particularly detailed information, can supplement 
quantitative data in providing a picture of the soundness of a financial system. It can 
provide insights on risk behavior in financial operations, suggest reasons for entry 
barriers into financial markets, and provide a view of financial vulnerabilities. In 
particular, it is helpful to consider data on the (i) adequacy of institutional processes, (ii) 
legal infrastructure and regulatory frameworks that govern financial operations, (iii) 
standards and practices regarding accounting and disclosure, (iv) quality of monitoring 
and supervision of financial institutions, (v) incentive structures, and (vi) safety nets to 
account for overexposure to international financial markets. Examples could include 
compliance with Basel Core Principles, International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) core principles, and insurance core principles.
11 The challenge is 
to organize such qualitative information with informed judgment in light of current theory 
and an understanding of the past, as well as recent experiences of financial distress.  
 
(v)  Structural information is needed to provide an assessment of how a financial 
system works. Structural assessments are, for example, based on the structure of banks 
and their relative size, business strategy, ownership, concentration, and competitive 
situation. Data on ownership and market shares help identify institutions and sectors 
important to the entire financial system. For example, a rather narrow customer base for 
a bank would suggest a lack of competitiveness in the domestic market. 




As mentioned above, FSIs are backward-looking indicators with respect to measures of 
soundness. Composite indices can be helpful in making sense of an indicator system. In 
particular, indices on the health of the financial system have been proposed for use by 
the IMF, which has developed a composite variance weighted Financial Stress Index for 
                                                 
11 Reference can also be made to the World Bank’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC). 
12 The Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom (UK) adopted early on a more intensive 
supervision-based approach to focus on high-impact firms, key business outcomes, risks, model and 
strategy sustainability, technical capability of approved persons versus probity alone, sectoral and firm 
comparator analysis, liquidity and other specialist skills, more intensive information analysis on key 
risks, and assessments of remuneration policies and their impact on overall risk.  





13 A major aspect of such indices is to provide information on 
financial stability based on how the real economy and the financial sector interact, and to 
signal systemic stress in a more timely and effective fashion. For the period 1997–2008, 
the IMF index has managed to capture important episodes of financial stress. Another 
composite index,
14 the Financial Development and Strength Index,
  may be used to 
assess the interaction between financial development and financial stability, and to 
describe how this interaction influences levels and patterns of economic growth.  
 
Taken together, these various sources of information provide valuable input into 
qualitative and quantitative assessments of the resilience of financial systems amid 
financial distress. There are at least two aspects of macroprudential monitoring to be 
considered: (i) technical identification and (ii) interpretation of indicators.
15 It is important 
not only to define the purposes for which individual indicators are to be used, but also to 
discuss the analytical framework within which they are interpreted. Using quantitative 
assessments—such as scenario analysis, stress tests, and EWS—as well as available 
qualitative and structural information, can help determine the link between FSIs and 
changes in macroeconomic and market-based indicators. 
 
While the current study will focus on the banking system, regulated and unregulated 
financial institutions have become increasingly interlinked through markets and 
counterparty relationships, and the spillover effects from shocks can rapidly travel 
through these linkages and interactions as was the case during the recent financial 
crisis. For a long time, banking, insurance, and securities institutions covered the 
majority of financial intermediation. However, in recent years a wider range of institutions 
have come to play an increasingly important role in the functioning of the financial 
system in which more and more credit is intermediated through capital markets. As 
stated by Crockett (2009), "private pools of capital, such as hedge funds and private 
equity funds have, for example, grown enormously; money market mutual funds have 
come to raise and place increasing amounts of short-term funds; investment banks have 
greatly expanded their trading activities; and mortgage originators have been at the 
center of the creation of assets that underlie mortgage backed securities markets. 
Service providers such as clearing and settlement systems, credit-rating agencies, and 
auditing firms, have also come to play an increasingly important role in the efficient and 
secure distribution of credit. A new financial sector architecture will thus need to provide 
adequate macroprudential oversight of a much wider range of financial market 
participants than traditionally covered." 
 
                                                 
13 According to Balakrishnan et al. (2009), the IMF index comprises information on the banking sector, 
securities markets, and foreign exchange markets. Indicators used in the construction of the index 
include the "beta" from the capital asset pricing model of a banking sector stock price index; TED 
spread, which is the difference between interest rates on interbank loans and short-term United States 
(US) government debt (T-bills); slope of the yield curve; corporate bond spreads; stock market returns 
and return volatility; and (time-varying) volatility of the effective exchange rate. 
14 The methodology behind the Financial Development and Strength Index is provided by the Centennial 
Group (2009). 
15 Bhattacharyay (2004).  
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3.  Identification, Compilation, and Limitations of a 
Macroprudential Approach  
 
A macroprudential approach can play an important role in identifying weaknesses in 
financial systems. Given the costs of a financial crisis, any measures to minimize the 
chances of its occurrence are useful. Early detection—and convincing policymakers to 
act on vulnerabilities once detected—will allow policymakers to put in place mitigating 
steps to avert the occurrence of a crisis or at least minimize the resulting losses. But for 
macroprudential monitoring to be fruitful, it has to be harmonious with the existing 
monitoring system of an economy, taking into account the data constraints faced by 
different economies. The various components also become more meaningful when 
compared both in a cross-sectional dimension and a time dimension.  
 
Identifying and compiling the various components needed for a macroprudential 
approach can, however, be challenging both within individual economies and across 
economies. One such challenge is the identification of relevant data and information for 
assessing financial soundness and building effective watchdog systems that can signal 
vulnerabilities in a particular financial system. Indicators that are useful for predicting 
vulnerabilities in one country may not necessarily be useful for another because of 
differences in the stages of economic and financial development, including wide 
disparities in institutional and legal frameworks, the nature of financial markets, the array  
of financial instruments, and in the degrees of sophistication in monetary and financial 
data collection.  
 
Concerns over the data required for a macroprudential approach include excessive 
delay, inaccuracy, inadequacy, or incompleteness of the data compiled. The major 
reasons behind these concerns include: (i) spread of data in various databases and 
institutions; (ii) non-availability or non-applicability of some indicators; (iii) incomparability 
of indicators over time owing to the absence of or changes in accounting and prudential 
standards; (iv) lack of transparency and problems in the disclosure of data; and (v) late, 
incomplete, and inaccurate replies from participating institutions and agencies. In 
addition, the current list of indicators currently being monitored—at the country, regional, 
and global levels—may potentially increase. In the wake of the current global financial 
crisis, empirical research and monitoring suggest data gaps exist in specific sectors and 
markets—such as the real estate, corporate, and household sectors; and nonbank 
financial institutions (NBFIs)—that are relevant to assessing the health of a financial 
system. The lack of regular and uniform reporting of FSIs for the banking sector has, for 
example, created a clear data gap and incomplete information on other financial 
institutions, including NBFIs. Analysis has also shown that some FSIs have performed 
better than others in identifying the buildup of financial stress or are better suited as 
leading indicators, while other FSIs are more useful in identifying financial resilience 
during a crisis.
16 Work is also under way to develop financial stress indicators as 
monitoring tools and summary statistics of financial stress.
17 
 
                                                 
16 Burgi-Schmelz (2009) and the Financial Stability Board (October 2009) have written on what has been 
achieved in recent years to strengthen the international collection and distribution of statistical 
information, and what should be done to further improve international cooperation and fill the gaps 
highlighted by the recent global financial crisis. 
17 Monetary Authority of Singapore (2009).  




Any empirical analysis of FSIs, however, has to consider constraints about timeliness 
and data quality. Errors in reporting one FSI, such as nonperforming loans (NPLs), are 
likely to impact other indicators, such as profitability indicators and capital ratios. Some 
FSIs are also weighted averages of indicators for individual banks in a country, which 
can lower their accuracy. In addition, the weighting of indicators by asset size involves 
an implicit assumption that small banks will not create systemic risk. 
 
There are also measurement problems in both quantitative data and qualitative 
information. Poor banking supervision, which has been identified as a major contributing 
factor to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, is difficult to quantify while a qualitative 
assessment across countries may vary significantly. Other factors that are important in 
predicting a crisis yet are difficult to measure include the quality of corporate 
governance, independence of the national central bank, reliability of the legal system, 
political stability, and other institutional qualities. 
 
Designing macroprudential instruments are also unlikely to be set fully according to a 
fixed rule and are likely to be accompanied by the use of discretion in the decision 
making process. But the use of discretion
18 also has its caveats. Discretion within a 
macroprudential decision-making process may render it less predictable than under a 
fixed rule leading to uncertainty about future regulatory requirements as well as less 
effective. It may also lead to a decision making process susceptible to regulatory capture 
and biased towards forbearance with policy makers unwilling to act promptly to head off 
problems. To design a macroprudential decision making process that is both more 
predictable and effective would require at least some qualitative objective such as 
maintaining as stable supply of financial intermediation services, a transparent process 
of analysis which underpins a well communicated decision making process. This is, 
however, easier said than done. 
 
4.  Analyzing and Interpreting Macroprudential Components 
 
Although the various data components of a macroprudential approach are important for 
examining financial soundness, they have not been extensively analyzed empirically 
since a consistent time series, especially for FSIs, has been largely unavailable across 
economies. In addition, macroprudential data are mostly sector specific and thus do not 
necessarily quantify stability of the entire financial system. Measures of financial 
vulnerability and risk typically pertain to a single segment of the financial system. 
Despite such data limitations, there are several existing analytic methods that use a 
macroprudential approach to monitor economic and financial strengths and 
vulnerabilities. Analysis of macroprudential data entails understanding the linkages 
between macro developments in the economy and the financial system, as well as the 
exposure and soundness of financial institutions. Such an examination typically involves 
discovering emerging empirical patterns of financial health in advance. The potential 
impact of perceived vulnerabilities are gauged by observing overall patterns in the data, 
informed by past examples of systemic risk and a macroprudential framework to identify 
appropriate signals of vulnerability and distress.  
 
                                                 
18 For a discussion on rules versus discretion in building a macroprudential regime, see Bank of England 
2009.  
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4.1  Analysis of Macroprudential Data  
 
An initial descriptive approach for examining FSIs can be to compute benchmarks or 
thresholds against current values of indicators that can be judged as being “out of line.” 
Benchmarking can demonstrate how much an indicator deviates from an established 
mean. Benchmarks can include (i) running averages of indicators for an economy; (ii) 
historical averages of indicators for economies with previous crisis experience, wherein 
an average around the periods of crisis or periods immediately prior to the crisis could 
be used; (iii) prudential threshold values used by bank supervisory authorities or 
international financial institutions; (iv) average of an indicator for a peer group of 
economies with a strong financial system; (v) historical trigger points that have caused a 
financial crisis; and (vi) thresholds obtained from econometric and statistical models 
(e.g., EWS). Ideally, several benchmarks should be used for each indicator. The higher 
the number of indicators giving off signals during any given period indicates increased 
vulnerability for the financial system. Variations in the indicators may be due to inherent 
random variations or to special causes representing vulnerabilities that may need to be 
corrected through policy interventions. Such descriptive approaches are indicative of 
systemic vulnerabilities and may not necessarily reflect crisis periods.  
 
Monitoring the stability of financial systems, even in the context of a macroprudential 
approach, does not by itself provide a means of estimating the impact of a potentially 
destabilizing event on financial systems or individual institutions since it does not 
explicitly consider the causal relationships among the different macroprudential data 
being monitored. Econometric methods provide a means to assess the likelihood of 
financial instability or vulnerability. Such calculations should include (i) trend analysis, 
which detects financial system vulnerability when there are major fluctuations in a 
particular indicator; (ii) stress testing, which gauges vulnerability by estimating the 
impact of a range of future shocks to the system on certain variables; (iii) examinations 
of linkages between macroeconomic and macrofinancial factors, which can be used to 
predict FSIs, such as loan losses and corporate leverage, or an (iv) EWS to estimate the 
probability that a crisis will occur.
19 
 
Although much work has been carried out in developing EWS, the empirical literature 
suggests that the predictive accuracy of EWS is quite limited,
20 especially for banking 
crises, in part due to the data issues discussed above, issues regarding econometric 
modeling specification, and the complexity of financial systems. The limited predictive 
powers of EWS is also partly due to the daunting challenges of predicting ex ante 
system vulnerabilities and examining ex post financial crises. Currency and banking 
crises, for example, are not precisely defined events but econometric models, whether 
parametric or nonparametric, must define crisis dates with respect to the data being 
                                                 
19 An EWS model involves predicting either a banking crisis, currency crisis, stock market crisis, or debt 
crisis. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) used a multivariate logit model for predicting systemic 
bank crises in a large sample of developed and developing countries. The IMF Developing Country 
Studies Division uses an EWS based on a probit model for determining the probability of a crisis 
occurring within a 24-month forecast period. An alternative to such probability approaches are the 
nonparametric "signals" approaches, such as that developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), which 
extract signals from aggregate data. 
20 Berg et al. (2004) point out that EWS correctly predict most tranquil periods but fail to predict crises, 
while the percentage of false alarms is also high.  





21 The beginning of a crisis period may be easy to identify, but the time of crisis 
resolution is often difficult to precisely determine. EWS models inherently assume a 
static relationship between indicators and the risk of crisis, rather than allowing for a 
dynamic evolution of the financial structure throughout the course of the business cycle. 
In practice, historical experiences preceding financial instabilities vary considerably 
across economies, particularly between developed and developing economies. 
Moreover, development entails a fundamental transformation of a country's economic 
structure, suggesting that causal relationships are also not static. Econometric models, 
while often guided by economic theory, involve judgment on model specification, which 
often reflects what works best given the available data. Results of econometric methods 
may suggest that macroprudential data have weak statistical significance or might yield 
conflicting results with other methods. Nonparametric and parametric approaches have 
both been used, with empirical assessments
22 of these methods suggesting that 
nonparametric methods may be better suited for dealing with cross-country datasets. 
 
As an additional instrument in the toolbox of macroprudential analysis, stress tests 
identify common vulnerabilities across financial institutions that could undermine the 
overall stability of a financial system. These tests quantitatively evaluate the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on the financial system as a whole and on FSIs in particular. 
While designing scenarios that assume stresses to be large but plausible and then 
convincing authorities to use them may prove a challenge in itself, they provide forward-
looking estimates of how the value of some FSIs change in response to exceptional 
developments in the underlying risk factors. The latter may be based on historical or 
hypothetical scenarios, or on simulations from macroeconomic forecasting models. A 
number of regulatory authorities have undertaken economy-specific stress tests, which 
is somewhat analogous to the value-at-risk assessments employed by financial 
institutions for self-regulation of capital reserve requirements under the Basel II 
framework for banking supervision. Unlike EWS models that attempt to exploit cross-
country information to predict the likelihood of crisis in a given country, macro-level 
stress tests are tailored to the unique risk exposures, institutions, and economic 
structure of an individual country. The information from stress tests can help to identify 
weaknesses in data compilation, reporting systems, and risk management; and can 
ultimately contribute to a better understanding of the links between the financial system 
and the macro economy. 
 
Despite the many merits of quantitative methods, the ability of statistical tools to identify 
crisis episodes or to take full account of country-specific factors is inherently limited by 
the often unique and diverse nature of financial crises and buildup of stress. Bearing in 
mind that future crisis episodes are likely to be very different from previous ones, 
consultations with policymakers, market participants, and academics can prove valuable 
                                                 
21 Approaches to dating systemic banking crisis episodes follow closely on the work of Caprio and 
Klinglebiel (1996) and Caprio et al. (2005), which generated classifications based on assessments of 
national supervisory officials and other "expert" financial professionals and observable government 
interventions undertaken in response to periods of widespread banking distress. Over time, researchers 
made some refinements, but the basic approach to codifying a binary banking crisis indicator has 
remained.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) also largely follow Caprio et 
al. (2005), although they refined the frequency to monthly observations and identified a peak month. 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) recently updated the database of Caprio et al. (2005) through 2007, 
identifying 124 episodes between 1970 and 2007 using a similar methodology and adding some more 
qualitative accents to the indicator. 
22 Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo (2004).  
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in complementing quantitative statistical tools. In addition, the application of experience-
based “rules-of-thumb,” educated guesses, intuitive judgments, common sense, and 
innovative thinking can help identify new sources of potential vulnerabilities.
23 
 
4.2  Macroprudential Monitoring  
 
Although national central banks and supervisory agencies in many economies have long 
monitored and reported on issues relating to financial system stability, much of this work 
has not necessarily been carried out within a formal macroprudential approach to assess 
financial system soundness. In the wake of recent experiences of financial crisis and 
distress at the domestic, regional, and global levels, policymakers from individual 
economies and multilateral institutions have either begun or intensified work on 
macroprudential monitoring. 
 
The IMF and the World Bank have carried out a Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) as a regular part of IMF Article IV consultations to assist individual economies to 
(i) assess the stability of the financial system, including macroeconomic factors that 
could affect the performance of the system and conditions in the system that could affect 
the macroeconomy; (ii) assess the extent to which relevant financial sector standards, 
codes, and good practices are observed; (iii) assess the financial sector's reform and 
development needs. The World Bank uses FSAP and various risk-rating models in its 
lending decisions to determine the likelihood of default by its borrowers. The main areas 
covered in such risk-rating models are structural and macroeconomic indicators of 
economic performance and external vulnerability, external debt and its sustainability, 
political risk and policy performance, and history of debt service.  
 
ADB also carries out regular assessments of vulnerability of its member economies to 
domestic or exogenous shocks using macroeconomic and policy performance indicators, 
financial market indicators, and qualitative assessments. ADB has established a 
Regional Early Warning System for the ASEAN+3 economies,
24 which is based on 
frequently collected macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators. ADB’s Regional 
EWS is designed to signal an impending financial crisis, such as a currency crisis or a 
banking crisis, and is based on parametric and nonparametric approaches. Continuing 
work on ADB’s Regional EWS involves updating results based on the indicators’ current 
levels and supporting the development of capacities in member economies for economy-
specific EWS.  
 
 
5.  Empirical Macroprudential Analysis 
 
When macroprudential data are gathered, it is important to examine trends and patterns 
to support formulation and implementation of evidence-based policies. In this section, we 
consider macroprudential panel data assembled from 59 economies covering the period 
1993–2008. Although the panel data has a number of limitations, including missing data 
for some indicators over certain periods, the empirical analysis provided below provides 
                                                 
23 Ghosh et al. (2009). 
24 The Regional Early Warning System is maintained by ADB’s Office of Regional Economic Integration. 
ASEAN+3 comprises the 10 members of ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China, Republic of 
Korea, and Japan.      




insights into important determinants of financial soundness in developing economies in 
Asia vis-à-vis counterparts in other continents and developed economies. In addition, 
this exercise is intended to enhance the future use and refinement of macroprudential 
data. 
 
5.1  Data and Methodology 
 
The collected macroprudential data (Appendix—Table 1) includes annual data for the 
period 1993–2008 from 41 emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, and Europe, as 
well as from 18 selected developed economies. The data was compiled from various 
sources, including the Centennial Group, Bankscope, Datastream of Thomson Financial, 
Bloomberg, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. When multiple data sources are available for an indicator, 
preference is given to analyzing data sourced from the Centennial Group followed by 
data that has the most available records. Since the number of banks in each economy 
changes every year due to mergers, closures, and openings, economy-specific data on 
FSIs are not comparable across time. Neither can there be strict comparability across 
economies due to different accounting and prudential standards. For instance, indicators 
of asset quality, such as nonperforming loans or impaired loans, are subject to issues 
over incomparable definitions. Bankscope and Datastream data also may have self-
selection and reporting biases since the data are dependent on whether or not 
institutions have provided a consolidated report for that year. Such data limitations partly 
account for heterogeneity across economies and across time. 
 
The dynamics of change in the indicators, including episodes of financial vulnerabilities, 
can be studied carefully with the available panel data. Variation in the data over time 
may reflect how circumstances change with time, but these variations can also be 
inflated by the measurement and compilation issues described above. Very strong 
assumptions are required, whether one looks at country data or examines the panel 
data, to draw clear conclusions as sequencing in time does not necessarily reflect 
causation. 
 
Benchmarking exercises can be performed on each indicator to assess volatilities. Any 
out-of-line behavior may suggest the need for some corrective policy action. Signals of 













standardized unit of each FSI Xt at year t, using an estimated mean and standard 
deviation,  5 ; ; ˆ t X μ and
  5 ; ; ˆ t X σ , respectively, generated from a moving span of 5 years. 
Changes in the spread of each FSI could also be assessed by determining how much 
the estimate of the variance changes across time. Consider, for instance, comparing the 
variance estimate at time t
 
2
5 ; ; ˆ t X σ based on a moving span of 5 years as against some 
other estimate of the variance 
2
10 ; ; ˆ t X σ  based on a longer span of 10 years or an 
alternative estimate 
2
, ; ˆ peer t X σ  computed from a peer group of economies. The selected 
economies in the study were divided into four peer groups: developed economies, 
emerging Asia, emerging Europe, and emerging Latin America. It is well known that for a  
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can be compared with thresholds of their respective distributions, such as the 95
th  
percentiles of an F(4,5) distribution and an 
2
4 χ distribution, respectively. The signals 
extracted from the use of the latter ratio are likely to be greater than the former, owing to 
having more heterogeneity across countries rather than from comparisons of a country 
across time.     
 
To determine the relative importance of macroprudential data in summarizing features of 
financial soundness and the correlations of the data with each other, it can be useful to 
utilize factor analysis, which is a multivariate statistical method used to reduce a number 
of indicators into latent composite indices called factors. These factors account for the 
patterns of correlation among all of the original indicators and are relatively independent 
of one another. The degree of correlation between the original indicator and the final 
factor score is called a factor loading. Inspection of these loadings reveals the extent to 
which each of the original indicators contributes to the meaning of each of the factors. 
Therefore, to give an interpretation to a factor it is necessary to first identify what among 
the original indicators loads highly (> 0.5) onto a factor. Once the indicators that load 
highly on a particular factor have been identified, the group of indicators then provides a 
sense of what the factor means. Rotation of the factors is also often employed to 
improve the interpretation of the resulting factors. With complete (or pseudo-complete) 
panel data available, composite indices may even be generated with such statistical 
methods to give a full picture of the financial sector of an economy that may not be seen 
when one looks at each indicator separately. The factor analysis results may also help 
identify key FSIs and their relationships with other FSIs. Key FSIs can be examined in 
terms of historical trends and unusual behavior, whether on the economy level or across 
peer groups of economies.  
 
It is also possible to investigate the effects of various macroeconomic variables on key 
FSIs using panel regression fixed effects models:  
t i it i t i y , , ε μ α + + + = β X  
for i = 1, 2, … 59 countries, t = 1993, 1994, … 2009,  it X  is the i
th observation on K 
explanatory variables,  i μ represents country-heterogeneity effects, and  t i, ε is a model 
error term. Panel regression models allow us to determine the key macroeconomic 
variables that underlie movements in FSI and estimate changes in FSI given a unit 
change in some macroeconomic factor, ceteris paribus. The use of fixed effects 
regression allows us to control for omitted macroeconomic variables that differ among  




countries but are constant over time. An underlying assumption in such models is that 
the model error does not display autocorrelation. When there is suspicion that this 
assumption is untenable, variants on these “static” panel regression models have to be 
employed, such as  dynamic panel regression models
25 that include a lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side of the equation, e.g., 
t i it i t i t i y y , 1 , , ε μ λ α + + + + = − β X  
which also controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The indicators of macroeconomic 
developments and market indicators that were used for the study included real GDP 
growth rate,
26 inflation rate,
27 change in lending rate, domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector as a percentage of GDP (as a proxy measure of credit expansion),
28 the 
business cycle (proxied by the unemployment rate), and Moody's sovereign long-term 
debt foreign currency ratings. Previous studies
29 suggest that these macroeconomic 
factors and the qualitative information help explain variations in key FSIs. While other 
factors may also be important determinants of FSIs, the model specification employed is 
constrained by data availability. In addition, when multicollinearity is present (i.e., if some 
explanatory variables are correlated), it is challenging to determine the individual 
contribution of each explanatory variable to the FSI that is being explained since the 
effects of the explanatory variables are overlapping. Estimated regression coefficients 
may have unexpected signs and may be very imprecise. To address multicollinearity 
problems in regression models, it is common practice to either use transformations on 
the variables, which leads to a loss of ability to intuitively interpret the meaning of the 
variables, or to simply remove at least one of the explanatory variables that has a 
weaker relationship with the dependent variable. The challenge in formulating models is 
having results that provide rich insights about relationships among the variables given 
the available data.   
 
 
                                                 
25 Arellano and Bond (1991) introduced a Generalized Method of Moments estimator for this dynamic 
panel regression. The estimator uses lags t-1 and deeper of levels of the dependent variable and 
endogenous variables as instruments for the equation in first differences. The method has the 
advantage of allowing for the modeling of various factors as endogenously determined.   
26 Low or declining growth, sector slumps, and recessions can weaken the debt servicing capacity of 
domestic borrowers and lead to an increase in credit risk resulting in a negative impact on financial 
institutions' portfolios and profitability margins, and a reduction in their cash flows and reserves. On the 
other hand, increasing economic growth signals heightened investment and market confidence, which 
are associated with higher income and profitability for banks. 
27 Babihuga (2007) and Podpiera (2006) show varying relationships between inflation and nonperforming 
loans (NPL), and inflation and return on assets (ROA). According to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997), high inflation is associated with “macroeconomic mismanagement” that leaves the banking 
system vulnerable. Another explanation is provided by Evans et al. (2000) suggesting that higher 
inflation reduces the collateral value of loans, while lower inflation reduces the nominal income of banks 
thereby affecting their liquidity. A significant and rapid reduction in the rate of inflation could, however, 
lead to lower nominal income and cash flows thereby adversely affecting the liquidity and solvency of 
financial institutions. 
28 A sudden surge in bank lending creates financial vulnerability as credit quality deteriorates and risk 
increases. According to Evans et al. (2000), sharp swings in bank credit are an indication of poor loan 
assessment and quality. In fact, many studies have revealed that banking crises are caused by over-
optimism in credit creation (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). 
29 Babihuga (2007), Podpiera (2006), Goldstein and Turner (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).  
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5.2  Descriptive Analysis and Panel Regression Estimation Results 
 
The historical performance of the ratio of banks’ NPLs to gross loans
30 as well as trends 
in banks’ return on assets (ROAs)
31 across four peer groups are shown in Figure 2. In 
emerging Asia, the ratio of NPLs to total loans sharply increased in the aftermath of the 
1997/98 financial crises. On average, about 18% of loans in emerging Asia were 
nonperforming in 1998. This rate was nearly twice that of Latin America (7.4%) and five 
times that of the developed economies (3.9%) in the same year. However, the data on 
NPLs as a percentage of total loans shows that the situation in emerging Asia has since 
recovered. Meanwhile, banks in emerging Asia appeared to suffer a tremendous 
deterioration in their ROAs as a result of the 1997/98 financial crisis, reaching a low 
point of –1.8% in 1998. In 1994, at the onset of the Mexican financial crisis, Latin 
America experienced a decrease in ROAs from 1993 levels. While Latin America has 
experienced fluctuations in banking profitability, the region’s banks have generally 
exceeded the performance of emerging Asia and the developed economies across the 
entire period 1993 to 2008. This can be partly explained by the elevated spreads 
between deposit and lending rates in Latin America. 
 
Figure 2: Cross-Country Averages of Selected FSIs in Developed Countries, 
Emerging Asia, Europe, and Latin America (1993–2008): 
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Source: ADB staff calculations 
 
 
Results of the benchmarking exercises for each FSI (Appendix—Table 2) illustrate the 
complex nature of the financial health of economies. Analysis of FSIs can reveal insights 
about vulnerabilities in the financial sector even though FSIs do not always have to 
serve as early warning signals of a crisis. However, most FSIs listed below managed to 
positively identify crisis periods in Argentina, Brazil, People’s Republic of China, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, 
                                                 
30 The ratio of NPLs to gross loans is a common measure of the asset quality of banks. High levels of 
NPLs imply banking fragility since borrowers are not able to pay their loans and/or banks are not able to 
collect them (Podpiera, 2006). This ratio is a backward-looking indicator since it can only be observed 
after it has occurred. 
31 The ratio of net income to total asset or ROAs reflects banking profitability and the efficiency of the bank 
utilizing its assets (IMF, 2006; Evans et al. 2000). A higher ROA value implies better performance.  




UK, US, and Viet Nam. These FSIs include banks’ ROAs, return on equity, ratio of equity 
to total assets, Z score, ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, ratio of NPLs 
to total loans, ratio of customer deposits to total loans, ratio of credit to bank deposits, 
average daily turnover ratio in securities, interest rate spread, ratio of personnel 
expenses to noninterest expenses, ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities, ratio of 
(broad and core) liquid assets to total assets, ratio of non-interest expense to gross 
income, and ratio of interest margin to gross income. Some FSIs successfully identified 
crisis periods of developed economies, while others were successful in identifying crises 
in developing economies.   
 
Appendix—Table 3 shows that there is significant correlation among some of the FSIs 
as well as, between some FSIs and their lags, which suggests it is important to monitor 
FSIs. In addition, FSIs can provide redundant information about financial health and 
vulnerabilities. Consequently, it is also important to make use of data reduction tools on 
the available macroprudential data. Results of a factor analysis provided composite 
indices that suggest the importance of indicators of capital adequacy
32 and liquidity, as 
well as profitability. The first composite index from the rotated factor analysis may be 
interpreted to represent an economy’s ability to meet its obligations and demand for 
funds since the following FSI ratios are loading high on the index: regulatory capital to 
risk-weighted assets, bank credit to bank deposits, capital to assets, customer deposits 
to total (non-interbank) loans, and various liquidity indicators. The second index—largely 
comprising ratios of ROAs and return on equity, and indicators on nonperforming 
loans—shows the importance of profitability and asset quality in monitoring financial 
soundness. The third index also shows the importance of assessing the earnings of 
economies, specifically, the ratios of interest margins to gross income, and noninterest 
expenses to gross income. Outlier behavior can be observed for some economies, such 
as Thailand in 1999 and Indonesia in 2003, in the first two indices (Figure 3), which may 
















                                                 
32 Capital adequacy and the availability of capital determine how robust financial institutions’ balance 
sheets are to shocks and are primary indicators in assessing the degree of financial fragility in the 
banking sector. An adverse trend in aggregate risk-based capital ratios (i.e., the ratio of capital to risk-
adjusted assets) may signal increased risk exposure and possible capital adequacy problems. 
According to the Basel Accord, a bank’s own funds must account for at least 8% of the risk-weighted 
value of its assets and off-balance sheet activities.  
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Figure 3: Behavior of Economies—Indices of Capital Adequacy and Liquidity,  
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Source: ADB Staff Calculations 
 
 
Appendix—Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the key FSIs and non-FSIs used in 
a panel regression analysis of selected key FSIs. As the table shows, the variables are 
dispersed across economies and over time. For the key FSIs to be explained, the 
standard deviation is larger "between" than "within," demonstrating the considerable 
amount of diversity among economies. 
 
Determinants of capital adequacy are shown in Appendix—Table 6 and are based on 
panel regression models of the ratio for customer deposits to total loans. Capital 
adequacy, as was noted in the empirical factor analysis results, correlates positively with 
liquidity. The immediate past of customer deposits has a strong positive association with 
its current value. This relationship is displayed across regions, with a 1.0% change in the 
previous year expected to yield about a 0.4%–0.75% change in the current year, ceteris 
paribus.  Domestic credit provided by the banking sector, which serves as a proxy 
indicator of lending booms, is found to have a positive relationship with capital 
adequacy, especially in Europe and Latin America. As expected, significant changes in 
bank lending rates, which reflect economic instability, are negatively associated with 
customer deposits. Economic growth, as expected, is negatively correlated with capital 
adequacy since a low or declining growth rate, or recession, can reduce cash flows and 
reserves. The relationship is found to be strong particularly in developed economies and 
in emerging Europe. As expected, a considerable increase in lending rate is negatively 
associated with capital adequacy. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector also 
displays a positive association with customer deposits, especially in emerging Europe 
and Latin America.  




Appendix—Table 7 presents factors that explain asset quality, specifically, the ratio of 
banks’ NPLs to total loans. GDP per capita is, as expected, negatively associated with 
NPLs, at least in the short-term. This relationship is particularly strong in developed 
economies and emerging Europe. Inflation shows a negative relationship with NPLs in 
developed economies, ceteris paribus, but a positive relationship in emerging Latin 
America. There appears to be some evidence that the business cycle, as proxied by the 
unemployment rate, shows a positive relationship to NPLs, but only in Emerging Europe. 
Asset quality should be monitored closely, as a 1.0 % change in the ratio of NPLs to total 
loans is associated with 0.36% change in the next period’s value. While the empirical 
results from the regression models are limited by model specification and data 
availability, they show diversity in the relationships between FSIs and the macro 
economy, and also suggest that these relationships depend on the stage of development 
of an individual economy. The strong dependence of the current value of an FSI to its 
immediate past performance also ultimately suggests the importance of macroprudential 
monitoring. 
 
6. Challenges  Ahead  and Policy Options 
 
6.1  Developing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision that can 
Complement and Reinforce Monetary Policy in Sustaining Economic 
Growth  
 
The macroprudential approach to supervision should complement and reinforce 
monetary policy in sustaining economic growth. Maintaining medium- to long-term price 
stability is usually considered to be the overarching objective of monetary policy. Price 
stability in general promotes financial stability by anchoring inflationary expectations, 
which reduces the risk of deflation and helps stabilize economic activity. Monetary policy 
has been particularly relevant amid the current crisis in stabilizing financial sectors 
around the world. On the other hand, a sound financial system can contribute to price 
stability and macroeconomic stability by facilitating the transmission of monetary policy 
actions and cushioning the impact of macroeconomic shocks through the financial 
sector. In addition, a stable and sound financial system decreases the incidence of 
financial stress and crisis, and leads to less disruption to economic activity, which 
contributes to price stability. In the aftermath of the current global economic crisis, many 
policymakers and commentators have suggested that central banks should pay more 
attention to the financial sector and financial excess, and possibly, where such is not 
already the case, take on financial stability as a statutory objective or guiding principle. 
But it is also true that those who have recognized this have by no means been immune 
to the crisis. 
 
There may be a trade-off between price and financial stability in certain circumstances, 
as shown by the recent financial crisis. High growth and low inflation and interest rates in 
recent decades, which has come to be known as the "Great Moderation," created an 
environment encouraging increased risk-taking and more leveraging, which 
subsequently lead to the asset bubbles that underlay the recent crisis. In this 
environment, policymakers are facing a trade-off between future financial stability and 
present price stability. The first half of 2008 also created another dilemma for central 
banks in many economies as inflation around the world rose due to high oil and  
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commodity prices, while at the same time financial stability was in jeopardy as major 
economies were experiencing a credit crunch due to the bursting of the housing bubble 




According to Tinbergen's principle
34 relating the number of instruments to the number of 
policy objectives, monetary policy tools may not be useful in targeting financial stability. 
Policymakers need additional tools other than the interest rate, particularly when there 
are trade-offs between policy objectives. Interest rate policy may be too powerful and 
blunt to address financial stability. Factors affecting financial stability, such as asset 
price bubbles, may require a major change in the interest rate, which would cause 
material damage to other parts of the economy. The empirical results in the previous 
section suggest, in the light of the importance of capital adequacy and profitability 
indicators, that macroprudential policy tools—such as capital adequacy requirements, 
additional capital buffers for banks, guidance regarding leverage ratios, and liquidity 
management of financial institutions—may be more appropriate. However, applying 
additional capital requirements for macroeconomic reasons that are not directly related 
to individual financial institutions is not a straightforward process and would have 
feedback effects on interest rates and thus monetary policy. However, while there is a 
growing consensus that monetary policy may also have a role to play in maintaining 
financial stability by leaning against asset bubbles,
35 the rapid expansion of central bank 
balance sheets—resulting from their intervention on behalf of individual systemically 
important institutions that were under particular liquidity stress—risks compromising 
price stability. It is important to recognize that policies have to evolve, and depend on 
data. 
 
The rapid buildup of central bank balance sheets came about as a result of both 
standard and innovative tools used to supply liquidity. Central banks acting in their 
traditional role as lender of last resort had to adapt radically to (i) lend at longer 
maturities, (ii) accept lower quality collateral, and (iii) lend to investment banks. In 
addition, price stability can be compromised by expanded balance sheets as (i) large 
excess reserves can result in rapid credit growth and inflationary pressure, (ii) certain 
assets can be hard to use for monetary policy and liquidity management, (iii) a reliance 
on quantitative tools might make it difficult to judge the stance of monetary policy, and 








                                                 
33 Many central banks also ignored inflation when it was high but did not ignore it when it was low for 
structural reasons and when tight monetary policy may have been the better option. 
34 Tinbergen's principle states that to attain a given number of independent policy objectives, there must 
be at least an equal number of instruments. The principle is concerned with the existence and location 
of a solution to the system. It does not assert that any given set of policy responses will, in fact, lead to 
that solution. To assert this, it is necessary to investigate the stability properties of a dynamic system. 
35 William R. White, 2009; Howard Davies, 2009: and Janet Yellen, 2009. 
36 Cottarelli and Vinals, 2009.  




6.2  Coordination between Financial Safety Net Players and Fiscal 
Authorities, and Communication Strategies for Policymakers 
 
In addition to the technical difficulties of identifying vulnerabilities lies the challenge for 
any EWS, scenario analysis, or stress test: persuading policymakers to act upon 
vulnerabilities once they have been identified. For this, a deep understanding of the 
nature of financial vulnerabilities and ultimately of systemic risk is needed. Financial 
safety net players and fiscal authorities thus need to engage policymakers in clear and 
well calibrated communication that is established by comprehensive evidence that is 
carefully weighed and analyzed. Such analysis would include not only a description of 
the underlying sources of financial vulnerability, but also the shocks that may cause the 
vulnerability to unwind, and how these shocks can be transmitted across sectors, 
markets, and economies. Early warnings would also need to be accompanied by a clear 
set of policy options that emphasize the trade-offs between addressing different types of 
risks and underscore the need for not only national policy coordination but also regional 
and international policy coordination.
37 Fragility in the financial sector can also have 
spillover effects on consumer and investor confidence, capital flows, public finances, and 
financial intermediation. 
 
To achieve this, there is the necessity for close co-ordination and co-operation among 
financial safety net players, fiscal authorities, and policy makers. This in turn stems from 
the possibility of conflicting mandates which could undermine the effectiveness of 
handling financial vulnerabilities and especially when the need to handle bank failures 
arises. Although the precise mechanisms of coordination will depend on each respective 
economies institutional set-up, there should be a clearly articulated division of powers 
and responsibilities agreed upon by the participants to prevent, as much as possible, the 
unproductive overlapping and duplication of activities. 
 
6.3  Regional and Global Coordination and Cooperation 
 
This crisis that first unraveled in mid-2007 proved once again that coordination and 
cooperation are mandatory at the national, regional, and global levels when responding 
to systemic failure. Reform proposals and detailed action plans have emerged in various 
global forums. Thus far they focus on building global standards in regulation, 
strengthening cross-border supervision, and enhancing market transparency. They also 
call for an effective global mechanism for crisis prevention and management. However, 
there are huge gaps between declarations of reform policies and their actual 
implementation. Proper crisis management is also contingent on data, and making 
sense of data.  
Additional cooperation is required to ensure regional and global financial stability. To 
strengthen financial systems with appropriate macroprudential oversight and extend 
supervision over a wider set of market segments and institutions, especially those 
deemed systemically important, policymakers from around the region and globe will 
need to work together. It is also important that Asia actively participates in the reform 
process to ensure that the new financial architecture matches the needs of globalized 
finance with the region’s financial development agenda. 
 
                                                 
37 Ghosh et al., 2009.  
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In addition to systematically introducing a macroprudential approach to the supervisory 
framework, ASEAN+3 encourages greater cooperation in monitoring and surveillance. 
One positive example of regional cooperation is the expansion and multilateralization of 
the ASEAN+3 reserve pool, which is also known as the Chiang Mai Initiative. This 
initiative includes the establishment an independent regional surveillance mechanism to 
support the reserve pooling mechanism. This will initially involve expanding current ADB 
and ASEAN Secretariat work that objectively monitors economic performance and 
assesses financial vulnerabilities. The negotiated institutional structure approved by the 
13 members of ASEAN+3 could provide the basis for future rules-based regional 
institutions. 
 
To further strengthen cooperation and to ensure regional and global financial stability, 
ADB also supports the establishment of a high-level Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
which would include officials from finance ministries and central banks, and other 
financial regulators and supervisors. The Asian Financial Stability Dialogue could 
coordinate supervisory and regulatory developments as well as monitor potential 
financial vulnerabilities through the use of objective EWS and other similar mechanisms 
of empirical analysis, as well as engage the private sector in financial market 
development. 
 
In going forward, lessons could also be drawn from Europe's response to the current 
situation where several new EU institutions have been established for systemic risk. 
These include two new pillars of the EU framework: (ii) the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) which is macro-prudential in focus; and (ii) the European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS) which is micro-prudential in focus. The new EU institutions 
will coordinate with both international institutions, such as the IMF and the FSB, as well 





























7. Appendix   
 
Table 1: List of Indicators Compiled and Examined 
Indicator Description  Data  Source  Remarks 
FSIs 
    
cenbrcrwar  Regulatory capital to risk 
weighted capital 
CG  Capital Adequacy indicator   
imfbcar     Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk 
weighted assets 
IFS  Capital Adequacy indicator   
cenbzscore  Return on Assets plus capital 
asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of asset 
returns 
CG Asset  Quality  indicator; 
inversely proportional to 
probability of insolvency 
cenbnpltlr   Bank Nonperforming Loans to 
Total (Gross) Loans 
CG Asset  Quality  indicator; 
available also from IFS 
(imfbnpltl) , WDI (wdibnpltgl) 
BS ( bsnpltgl)  
cenbroa    Return on Assets   CG  Earnings and profitability 
indicator; available also from 
BS (bsroa) and IFS (imfbra) 
cenbroe  Return on Equity  CG  Earnings and profitability 
indicator; available also from 
IFS (imfbroe),  BS (bsroe) and 
DS (dsbroe) 
cenimgir Interest  margin to gross income  CG  Earnings and profitability 
indicator; available also from 
BS (bsimgi) 
cenniegir  Noninterest expenses to gross 
income 
CG  Earnings and profitability 
indicator; indicator; available 
also from BS (bsnegi) 
bsclata Liquid  assets to total assets 
(liquid asset ratio)  
BS  Liquidity Indicator; used core 
liquid assets 
bsblata   Liquid assets to total assets 
(liquid asset ratio) 
BS  Liquidity Indicator; used broad 
liquid assets 
cenbcbdr  bank private credit to bank 
deposits 
CG  Liquidity Indicator  
cenlastl Liquid  assets to total short term 
liabilities 
CG  Liquidity Indicator;  used core 
liquid assets; available also 
available from BS (bsclast) 
cenbcar   Capital to assets ratio  CG  Deposit Takers  Indicator; 
Available also from IFS 
(imfbca), WDI (wdibca),  
and BS (bsca) 
bstigi  Trading income to total income  BS  Deposit Takers Indicator 
bspene Personnel  expenses  to 
noninterest expenses 
BS  Deposit Takers Indicator  
26          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 43 
 
Indicator Description  Data  Source  Remarks 
wdiis  Spread between reference 
lending and deposit rates 
WDI  Deposit Takers Indicator 
cenbcdtlr  Customer deposits to total 
(noninterbank) loans 
CG  Deposit Takers Indicator ; 
Available also from BS 
(bscdtnl) 
wdisttr  Average daily turnover ratio in 
the securities market 
WDI Market  Liquidity Indicator   
cennpler   NPL to Equity  CG  Other FSIs; Available also from 
BS (bsnple) 
cenetar   Equity to Asset  CG  Other FSIs; Available also from 
BS (bsea) 
bsnplc  NPL to Capital  BS  Other FSIs 
Non-FSIs      
wdigdppcpppcon  GDP per capita  WDI  Macroeconomic Indicator; In 
PPP (constant 2005 
international $) terms 
wdigdpgrowth  Real GDP growth rate  WDI  Macroeconomic Indicator 
wdigdscons  Gross domestic savings 
(constant LCU) 
WDI Macroeconomic  Indicator 
wdiunem  Unemployment rate  WDI  Macroeconomic Indicator; % of 
total labor force 
ifsimports  Imports, cif (average for the year)  IFS  In Million USD 
ifsinf  Inflation  IFS  Available also from WDI 
(wdiinfcpi) 
wdimqmgdp  Money and quasi money (M2)   WDI  Monetary Indicator; as % of 
GDP. 
wdimqmg  Money and quasi money growth  WDI  Monetary Indicator;  Annual % 
ifstrlg  Total reserves less gold  IFS  Monetary Indicator 
ifsrflfa   Ratio Foreign Liabilities to 
Foreign Assets 
IFS Monetary  Indicator 
ifsrri    Ratio of Total Reserves to 
Imports 
IFS Monetary  Indicator 
Ifslr  Lending Rate  IFS  Monetary Indicator 
jedhrstr JEDH_IFS_Ratio ST External 
Debt_Reserves 
IFS Monetary  Indicator 
wdidcbs  Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector   
WDI  Monetary Indicator; As % of 
GDP 
wdirir  real interest rate  WDI  Monetary Indicator 
wdireeri WDI_Real  effective  exchange 
rate index  
WDI  (2000 = 100) 




sovratings  Sovereign Long Term Debt 
Foreign Currency Ratings 
Moody’s Market  Indicator 
  Note: This list is only a partial list of all the indicators being compiled. It does not include other macroprudential 
indicators (with few records across economies and across the years).    




Table 2: List of Economies Displaying Vulnerability Signals  
According to Selected FSIs 
 
Indicator  F Test  Chi –Square Test 
Regulatory capital to 
risk weighted capital 




b; 2003), Belgium 
(2008-2009), Brazil (2004), Bulgaria 
(2003-2006), People’s Republic of China 
(2003-2008), Finland (2003-2008), 
Indonesia (2002-2003; 2009), Japan (2001; 
2006), Pakistan (2001), Romania (2001-
2002; 2008), Serbia (2009), Singapore 
(2002; 2007), Slovakia (2006-2007), 
Sweden (2002-2006), Turkey (2003-2008), 
Venezuela (2005-2008) 
Regulatory Tier 1 
capital to risk weighted 
assets 
Poland (2008)  Brazil (2003-2004), Bulgaria (2002-2006), 
People’s Republic of China (2006-2007), 
Finland (2003-2008), Japan (2006), 
Romania (2007-2008),  Singapore (2007), 
Slovakia (2002-2003; 2006-2007), Sweden 
(2002), Turkey (2004-2008), Venezuela 
(2005-2007)  
Return on Assets plus 
capital asset ratio 
divided by the standard 
deviation of asset 
returns 
  Australia (2002-2007), Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  (1999-2000), Bulgaria (2001), 
Chile (2002-2003), People’s Republic of 
China (2003-2007), Colombia (1999-2000; 
2006), Ecuador (2001-2002); Estonia (2004 
-2007), Finland (2001-2004, 2006-2007), 
Greece (2006-2007), Hong Kong (1997-
2000, 2005 -2007), Japan (1997-1998), 
Korea (1997-2000), Lithuania (2007), 
Mexico (1997-1998), Netherlands (1998), 
Peru (2006 -2007), Philippines  (2000; 2002 
-2007), Singapore (1997-1998), Slovakia 
(2007), Slovenia (1997-1998), Sri Lanka 
(2001-2003), Sweden (1999-2003), Thailand 
(1997
a, 1998
b, 1999), Ukraine (2003) 
Bank Nonperforming 
Loans to Total (Gross) 
Loans 
 
Peru (2007), Spain (2008), 
Denmark (2008), Hungary 





Argentina (2005-2008), Bangladesh (2000-
2001), Bosnia & Herzegovina  (2001), 
Bulgaria (2003-2004), Cambodia (2003-
2005), People’s Republic of China (1999; 
2006-2007), Ecuador (1997; 1999-2004), 
Hong Kong (1999-2001; 2003-2007), 
Indonesia (2000-2006), Italy (2000; 2002-
2003), Japan (2003-2007), Lithuania (2000), 
Malaysia (1998
b), Peru (2007-2009), Poland 
(2006-2008), Romania (2001-2003), Serbia 
(1999; 2003-2009), Singapore (2001-2008), 
Spain (2008-2009), Thailand (2002-2003), 
Turkey (2004-2005), USA (2009), Ukraine 
(1999-2000; 2006-2009), Venezuela (1998) 
Viet Nam (2008) 
 
Return on Assets  Bangladesh (2008), Canada 





b; 2003-2007), Bangladesh 
(2007-2008), Belgium (2008), Bulgaria 
(1999), Cambodia (2006-2007), Colombia 
(1999-2001; 2009), Ecuador (2001); Hong 
Kong (1997-2004), Indonesia (1998
b;1999
c;   
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2000-2005), Japan (2003-2006), Latvia 
(1997-1998; 2008-2009), Lithuania (1997); 
Myanmar (1997); Norway (2003), Pakistan 
(1997; 2005), Russia (1998-2000; 2002), 
Serbia (2006-2008), Singapore (1997-2000), 
Thailand (1997
a, 1998
b, 1999-2003), Turkey 
(2001-2005), UK (2008), USA (2008), 
Ukraine (1998; 2009), Venezuela (1997-
2000; 2007-2008) 
 
Return on Equity  Latvia (2009), Netherlands 
(2008), Ukraine (2009), 
Canada (2006), France (2008) 
Argentina (2002
b; 2003-2007), Bangladesh 
(1997; 2006-2008), Belgium (2000-
2002;2004;2008-2009), Bulgaria (1998-
2001), Colombia (1998
a; 1999-2001; 2009), 
Finland (1998-2001); France (1997); Japan 
(1998-2006), Korea(1998
b; 1999; 2001-
2002), Latvia (2008-2009), Lithuania  (1997-
1999), Netherlands (2008), Pakistan (1997; 
2004-2005), Serbia (2006); Slovakia (2003), 
Sweden (1997); Taipei (2006), Thailand 
(1998
b; 1999-2003), Turkey (2001-2005), 
UK (2001-2003), Ukraine (1997-1999; 
2009), Venezuela (1997-2000) 
Interest margin to gross 
income 
Canada (2008), Italy (2002-
2003), Netherlands (2008), 
Slovakia(2002), Belgium 





Argentina (2004-2005); Bhutan (1998-1999); 
Brazil (2005-2006); Bulgaria (1997-2001), 
Cambodia (2001-2003), Canada (2008), 
Chile (1997-2001; 2004; 2007-2008); 
Ecuador (1999-2003), Hong Kong (1998-




c; 2000-2003); Italy (2002-2006), Lao 
PDR (2006-2008);  Netherlands (2008), 
Norway (1997-2006), Philippines (2005), 
Poland (2007-2008), Serbia (1999-2001; 
2008), Singapore (2007-2008), Slovakia 
(2002-2008), Sweden (2007), Taipei (2004; 
2008) 
Noninterest expenses 
to gross income 
Canada (2008), Austria (2008), 
Hong Kong (2002), Singapore 




Argentina (2006-2007); Bangladesh (2008), 
Bulgaria (1997-1998); Cambodia (1999-
2002; 2004-2005), Canada (2008), Chile 
(1997-2001; 2004-2008), Denmark (1997-
1998), Ecuador (1999-2005), Hong Kong 
(2001; 2008), Indonesia (1998
b; 1999
c; 
2000-2003), Italy (2002-2006), Japan (1999-
2001), Lao PDR (2006-2008), Netherlands 
(2008), Norway (1997-2009; 2002-2007), 
Pakistan (2005), Romania (2008), Russia 
(1998-2002), Singapore (1999-2000),  
Slovakia (1999-2008), Sweden (1997-1998); 
Thailand (1997
a, 1998
b, 1999)  




Indicator  F Test  Chi –Square Test 
Liquid assets to total 
assets (using  core 
liquid assets) 
France (2005), Netherlands 






Austria (1998-1999), Bangladesh (2004-
2005), Belgium (2006-2007), Brunei 
Darussalam (1998-2003; 2006), Canada 
(1997), People’s Republic of China (1997, 
1998a, 1999-2000; 2008), Denmark (2001-
2002), Ecuador (2008), Estonia (1998), 
Finland (2002-2006), France (2004-2007), 
Germany (2008), Greece (2000-2006; 
2008), Latvia (1997-1999), Netherlands 
(2006-2007), Peru (1998-1999), Philippines 
(2006-2008), Serbia (2001-2007), 
Singapore (2002-2007), UK (2000; 2008), 
Venezuela (2003-2007), Viet Nam (1999-
2002) 
Liquid assets to total 
assets (using broad 
liquid assets) 
Australia (2006), Belgium 
(2004), Serbia (2003-2004), 
Singapore (2006), Germany 





Argentina (2005); Australia (1997-1998; 
2002-2007), Belgium (2000-2006), Brunei 
Darussalam (1998; 2003), Bulgaria (2000); 
Canada (1997); Chile (2002),  People’s 
Republic of China (1997-1998; 2008), 
Colombia (2000-2001), Denmark (2001-
2002), Finland (1997), France (2008), 
Indonesia (1999
c; 2000-2002, 2004-2006), 
Japan (2008), Latvia (1997-2000); 
Philippines (2005-2007), Poland (1997-
1998), Serbia (2001-2007), Singapore 
(2002-2007), Spain (1999), Turkey (1998-
2004, 2006-2008), Venezuela (1997-1998; 
2004-2006), Viet Nam (2008) 
Bank private credit to 
bank deposits 
  Argentina (2005), Bhutan (2008), Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (2001-2004), Brazil (1998),  
Cambodia (2008), Canada (2007-2008), 
Colombia (2001-2004, 2007-2008), Croatia 
(1997-1998), Denmark (2000-2003, 2005-
2006), Ecuador (1999-2003),Estonia (1997); 
Finland (2005-2007), Indonesia (1999
c; 
2000- 002, 2005), Italy (1997-2002), Korea 
(2007-2008), Latvia (2006-2008), Lithuania 
(2006, 2008), Mexico (1997; 1998
a), Serbia 
(2003-2005), Slovenia (2007), Sri Lanka 
(1997-1998), Sweden (2002-2004), Thailand 
(1999-2003), UK (1997); Ukraine (1998-
2000; 2008), Viet Nam(1999; 2003-2006) 
Liquid assets to total 
short term liabilities 
Philippines (2004), UK (2004)  Argentina (2005), Australia (1998-2000; 
2007), Bangladesh (2008), Brazil (1999
b), 
Bulgaria (2005-2006), Chile (2004-2008), 
Denmark (1997-1998; 2001), Ecuador (200--
2003), Estonia (2005-2008), France (2008), 
Hong Kong (1997-2005), Italy (2001-2007), 
Latvia (1998-2000; 2005-2007), Pakistan 
(2000; 2002-2006), Serbia (2001-2004), Sri 
Lanka (1997-1999), Sweden (2001; 2007-
2008), Taipei (2004-2008), Thailand (2007), 
Turkey (1999), UK (2008), Viet Nam (1998-
1999)  
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Indicator  F Test  Chi –Square Test 
Capital to assets ratio    Bosnia & Herzegovina (2005), Bulgaria 
(2005-2008), Croatia (2008), Ecuador 
(2001-2002), Finland (2003-2008), 
Indonesia (2001-2005), Japan (2001), 
Mexico (2008-2009), Pakistan (2006-2009), 
Serbia (2006-2009), Spain (2002), Turkey 
(2003-2005), UK (2002-2006), Ukraine 
(2003), Venezuela (2006-2009) 




Argentina (2005; 2008), Australia (2004), 
Belgium (1999-2002), Brunei Darussalam 
(2003), Bulgaria (2002-2005), People’s 
Republic of China (2003-2005), Colombia 
(2000), Denmark (2001-2008), Ecuador 
(2003), Estonia (1998), Hong Kong (2003-
2007), India (2008), Indonesia (1997a, 
1998b, 1999c, 2001-2002), Korea (2000-
2002), Latvia (1998), Mexico (2001-2002), 
Netherlands (1998-1999; 2008), Norway 
(1997-1999), Peru (1998), Poland (1997; 
1999-2000), Romania (2008), Russia (2007-
2008), Serbia (2003-2007), Singapore 
(2000), Slovakia (1999), Taipei (2005-2007), 




reference lending and 
deposit rates 
  Argentina (2004-2006), Brazil (2001-2003; 
2006-2007), Bulgaria (1998-2001), 
Cambodia (2003-2005), Croatia (1997), 
Denmark (1997-1998), Ecuador (2000), 





2006), Lao PDR (2002-2003; 2005-2007), 
Mexico (1999
b;c); Netherlands (1997; 1999-
2004), Peru (1997-1998); Romania (2007), 
Russia (1999-2000; 2002-2004), Serbia 
(2005); Sri Lanka (2004-2005; 2007), 
Ukraine (2002-2006) 
Customer deposits to 
total (noninterbank) 
loans 
Colombia (2002), Ecuador 
(2003) 
Argentina (2003-2008), Belgium (2005; 
2007-2008), Bhutan (1997-2008), Brazil 
(2000-2001); Bulgaria (1998; 2000; 2004-
2005), Cambodia (2002; 2008), Canada 
(2004, 2007-2008), Denmark (2000-2003), 
Hong Kong (2004-2008), Indonesia (1999
c; 
2000-2002; 2004-2006), Italy (1998-1999), 
Japan (2002-2005), Lao PDR (2003-2008), 
Myanmar (2007-2008), Romania (2002-
2006, 2008), Singapore(2006), Sri Lanka 
(1997-1998), Turkey (2001-2007), Ukraine 
(1997-2001), Venezuela (1997-1999; 2005-
2007)  




Indicator  F Test  Chi –Square Test 
Average daily turnover 
ratio in the securities 
market 
 Argentina  (2002
b; 2004-2007), Belgium 
(2002-2006), Brazil (1997; 2001-2003, 
2008), People’s Republic of China (1997; 
1998
a), France (1999), Germany (1999), 
Greece (2003), Hungary (2007), India 
(2006), Korea (1999; 2001-2002, 2004-
2006), Lithuania (2008), Netherlands (2001-
2002), Pakistan (1999-2008), Slovakia 
(2002-2006), Turkey (2007-2008), UK 
(2007




Slovenia (2005-2006)  Argentina (2006-2008), Bangladesh (1997-
1998; 2004-2008), Bulgaria (2000), People’s 
Republic of China (2004-2008), Ecuador 
(1997; 1999-2003), France (2001), Germany 
(2004; 2006-2008), Indonesia (2000-2002); 
Italy (2000-2007), Japan (2000-2007),  
Pakistan(1999-2005), Poland (2006-2007), 
Serbia (1999; 2003-2008), Singapore (2005-
2007), Slovakia (1999-2004), Slovenia 
(2005-2007), Turkey (2005), Ukraine (2008), 
Viet Nam (2008) 
  
Equity to Asset  Indonesia (2002), Denmark 
(2002) 
Belgium (2000-2002), Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(2001-2003), Brunei Darussalam (1998-
1999), Bulgaria (1997-1999), Cambodia 
(1999-2005), Chile (2005-2008), Colombia 
(1999), Denmark (2008), Ecuador (2000-




Lao PDR (2006-2008) Netherlands (1997; 
2000-2001; 2004-2007), Norway (1997); 
Poland (1997-1999; 2004-2007), Romania 
(2000; 2005-2007), Serbia (2003-2004, 
2008), Thailand (1997
a), Ukraine (1998; 
2000; 2002); Venezuela (1998-1999) 
Nonperforming Loans 
to Capital 
  Canada (1997-1999), People’s Republic of 
China (2005-2006), France (2008), 
Germany (2008), Hong Kong (2003), 
Indonesia (2007-2008), Italy (2004-2007), 
Japan (2004-2007), Lithuania (2001-2002), 
Poland (2008),  Romania (2006-2007), 
Slovakia (2003-2006), Spain (1998), Taipei 
(2004), Thailand (2001-2002), Turkey 
(2007), UK (1999-2002), Ukraine (2004-
2005) 
 
Note: According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), on certain years, countries experienced the start of systemic banking 
crisis (
a), currency crisis (
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Table 4: Loadings of Rotated Factors and Unique Variances of FSIs resulting  
from a Factor Analysis
38 of Available FSIs 
 
Variable Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Uniqueness 
Regulatory capital to risk weighted capital  0.7955 0.3206 0.1017  0.254 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk weighted 
assets  0.758 0.3451 0.1064  0.295 
Return on assets plus capital asset ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of asset 
returns -0.2104  0.2161  -0.1613  0.883 
Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total 
(Gross) Loans  0.2446  -0.5247 -0.0617  0.661 
Return on Assets  0.297 0.7917  -0.1268  0.2689 
Return on Equity  0.0921 0.7754  -0.139  0.3709 
Interest margin to gross income  -0.0295 0.0343 0.9366  0.1208 
Noninterest expenses to gross income  0.0026 -0.1169  0.9578  0.0689 
Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset 
ratio) 0.5784  0.1354  -0.1752  0.6164 
Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset 
ratio)  0.7392 0.0858  -0.1536  0.4226 
bank private credit to bank deposits  -0.6715 0.3689 0.0546  0.41 
Liquid assets to total short term liabilities  0.0134 0.4408  -0.0179  0.8052 
Capital to assets ratio  0.6224 0.3984  -0.0366  0.4526 
Personnel expenses to noninterest 
expenses  0.0283 0.4053  -0.036  0.8336 
Spread between reference lending and 
deposit rates  0.4001 0.0769  -0.0192  0.8337 
Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) 
loans  0.7072 -0.3293 -0.0614  0.3877 
Average daily turnover ratio in the 
securities market  -0.3517 -0.208  0.0355  0.8318 
NPL to Equity  -0.0784 -0.695  -0.0807  0.5044 
Equity to Asset  0.3585 0.3922  -0.1036  0.7069 














                                                 
38 Three unrotated factors were already explaining nearly eighty percent of the total variation in the FSIs.  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Economy-level key FSIs 
and non-FSIs, 1993-2008 
 
Standard Deviation  Variable Mean 






deposits to total 
(noninterbank) 
loans  118.0766 79.76567 51.00061  61.84559  890  58 
Bank 
Nonperforming 
Loans to Total 
(Gross) Loans   7.559694 9.222772 8.905672  6.679523  817  58 
Liquid assets to 
total assets 
(liquid asset 
ratio)  0.311362 0.150589 0.117302  0.10018  836  57 
Return on 
Assets 0.990821  1.796567 1.093451  1.574462  894  57 
Real GDP 
growth rate  4.21241  5.206988  2.561884  4.584035  865  58 
Inflation 27.16876  204.6201 64.61827  194.208  885  15.8036 




sector  75.15958 57.82877  55.0562  17.96437  845  58 
 GDP per capita    15626.74  12672.36  12581.07  2230.017  867  58 
Stock volatility   552.2126  1062.587  706.0482  786.5039  759  54 
Unemployment 
Rate  8.209395 4.333872 5.077867  2.104174  709  56 
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Table 6: Determinants of Capital Adequacy  
(as measured by Bank Customer Deposits to Total Loans) 
 
Fixed 


















Total Loans   0.6721** 0.3592*** 0.7376*** 0.5682*** 0.4199***  0.5894*** 
   (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Return on 
Assets   100.0000 120.0000***  -9.9140 180.0000*** 88.8732** 120.0000*** 
 (34.07)  (10.36)  (17.03)  (25.08) (29.23)  (19.52) 
L. Return on 
Assets   -65.0000 -26.0000*  4.7890 
-
140.0000***  -25.0000 -97.0000*** 
 (26.63)  (10.67)  (16.70)  (27.94) (25.34)  (23.05) 
Real GDP 
growth rate    -0.3655  -0.5107* -0.1383  0.0720  -0.0455  -0.4505 
 (0.18)  (0.26)  (0.71)  (0.62) (0.61)  (0.51) 
D.Lending Rate   -0.0970  -0.2175* 0.4416  -1.3364  0.0944 -0.2885 




sector   0.0597  0.3754***  -0.0046 -0.0106  0.3632*  0.4756* 
 (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11) (0.15)  (0.23) 
GDP per capita  -0.0017  -0.0024* 0.0011 0.0001  -0.0015 -0.0045 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Stock volatility  -0.0026  -0.0015  -0.0012 -0.0082  -0.0023  -0.0048* 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
CONSTANT 51.1234  56.3561***  -9.9655 38.0238*  58.8786**  57.4520 
 (19.92)  (14.49)  (51.56)  (15.79) (19.41)  (32.00) 
          
Observations  527 474 152 109  122  91 
Number of 
Groups  48 48 16 10  14  8 
Number of 
Instruments   113  99  96  111  91 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Time dummies 
included but not reported.  
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Table 7: Determinants of Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans 
  
Fixed 

















Loans to Total 
(Gross) Loans   0.5374*** 0.4249***  0.1632**  0.4695*** 0.4833***  0.0802 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05) (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.11) 
Return on 
Assets   -1.3103** -1.5044***  -0.3710**  -2.2293*** -1.7236*** -0.8237*** 
 (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.40) (0.42) (0.20) 
L. Return on 
Assets   0.1197 0.1976  0.0840  0.7297* -0.2257 -0.4834 
 (0.35)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.30) (0.35) (0.26) 
Real GDP 
growth rate    -0.3204* -0.5009***  -0.4385*** -0.1335  -0.7502***  -0.1491 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.24) (0.19) (0.08) 
Inflation   0.0017  0.0119  -0.3687*** -0.2368  0.0028  0.1456*** 




sector   0.0094 0.0590**  0.0142** 0.0166 0.0323  -0.0493 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Unemployment 
rate    0.0342  -0.2753*  -0.0201 0.1964  -0.1375  0.0400 
 (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.06)  (0.43) (0.23) (0.16) 
CONSTANT 51.1234  56.3561**  -9.9655*** 38.0238  58.8786  57.4520* 
 (19.92)  (14.49)  (51.56)  (15.79) (19.41) (32.00) 
            
Observations 527  474  152  109  122  91 
Number of 
Groups  48 48  16  10  14  8 
Number of 
Instruments   113  99  96  111  91 
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